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Abstract 
The 2001-2012 period has been one of very low growth for Portugal. This work project 
tries to find reasons for this slowdown. Growth in real GDP will be explained by several 
variables ranging from education, capital, government and world markets. Compensation of 
employees, capital per worker and the exports of competitors seem to explain a significant 
part of the slowdown. The ratio of non-tradables to tradables is also included but not 
significant, maybe due to a poor sample size. Stagnation then seems to be caused both by 
low growth in input accumulation and productivity as predicted by Amador and Coimbra in 
2007. 
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I. Introduction 
Stagnation is a problem largely forgotten about in the developed world. A period of 
sustained lack of growth implies a loss of economic power comparatively to most other 
countries. During the 2001-2012 period Portugal grew 0.1% and, alongside Italy, was the 
least growing country in the European Union. The average growth for the union was of 
1.3% and of 1.0% for the Euro Zone. This work project aims at exploring what were the 
reasons for the low growth Portugal had during this period. The explanations will be rooted 
in economic theory and several papers on stagnations.  
This decade had a lot of major world events influencing the economy. Two major 
stock market crashes and a bubble in between them. The introduction of the Euro and the 
rise of China are some of the factors that permeated the time period. Some of them were 
particularly hard hitting for Portugal. The Euro removed the ability to have a managed 
currency which ensured competitive exports. On the flip side it helped stabilize inflation, 
currency rates, and interest rates possibilitating cheaper external debt. Entry in the 
European Monetary Mechanism also changed the banking system of EU countries by 
forcing European wide rules and restrictions. Adding to that the 00s were a period of great 
growth for China, Korea, and the Eastern European countries as they entered the world 
exports market. This created new avenues for foreign direct investment and better deals for 
investment in low-wage environments. This period also had a great boom for commodity 
prices most representatively in oil and food prices. 
 The paper is divided 4 major parts. First a literary review that will look at both 
papers on lost decades and economic growth in general. Second, the variable choices and 
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sources will be presented. Third, the model will be presented and finally the estimation 
results discussed.  
II. Literary Review 
a) Stagnations 
Stagnations are normally caused by some underlying issues in the economy. The 
Japanese case is the most well-known as the fastest growing economy between 1960 and 
1980 suddenly stopped. The thesis normally presented for Japan is that there was a 
breakdown of the financial system leading to decreased investment gains. However 
Hayashi and Prescott (2001) show another possible explanation: that a generalized decrease 
in total factor productivity growth is to blame for the prolonged stagnation. In fact they 
attribute the bubble to the predicted future productivity growth which never happened. 
They state that the decrease in productivity stems from an exogenous decline in technology. 
Kawamoto (2004) analyses this thesis by creating a better estimate of technological growth. 
What he finds is that technology did not slow down. The productivity slowdown is then not 
due to a lacking technological progress but instead to other factors affecting productivity 
namely “increasing returns, imperfect competition, cyclical utilization of labor and capital, 
and reallocation effects.” 
 A paper by Bergoeing et al. (2002) explores the differences in growth between 
Mexico and Chile in the 80s. Both countries withstood a recession followed by stagnation. 
Chile had a much quicker recovery. Typical explanations for this difference range from the 
better monetary policy of Chile, the faster decline in real wages that fueled exports and 
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Mexico’s debt overhang. What Bergoeing et al. find is that Chile had better government 
policy in general which allowed for productivity gains. Market liberalization, Law changes, 
and financial system changes improved productivity and made sure that zombie firms 
stopped existing, opening up the market. 
Ricardo Reis wrote in 2013 a paper exploring the Portuguese case. Most facts 
associated with Portuguese low productivity did not suddenly change in the turn of the 
century and, according to Reis, cannot be the answer. Low education, increasing 
government size, a rigid labor market among a number of other issues are not the focus of 
his paper as they did not change much during this period. He argues that entry in 
international capital markets with an underdeveloped financial system created wrong 
incentives for investments which lowered productivity. As such, the large capital inflows 
associated with the entry in the Euro Zone incentivized banks to lend indiscriminately 
allowing inefficient firms to remain in operation. There was also a much larger investment 
in non-tradables which further increased the costs facing exports. 
Amador and Coimbra (2007) paint a different picture. They argue that what is 
lacking in Portuguese GDP growth, comparatively to Spain, Greece and Ireland, is that 
Portuguese growth is mostly reliant on input accumulation due to a low productivity rate. 
This is because of a lower capital-labor ratio and low-technology industries. Both papers 
agree that there are long-term issues in the Portuguese economic structure, the difference of 
opinion arises in whether or not they are to blame for the stagnation. Reis believes they 
aren’t and that it must be a new factor that appeared in the 00s namely the increase in 
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capital inflows and the over-investment in non-tradables. Amador and Coimbra state that 
the issue was low productivity and a stop in the accumulation of inputs. 
Finally Olivier Blanchard (2006) paints a grim picture of the Portuguese reality. He 
tries to lay down some possibilities for future policies which can be either through increases 
in productivity or decreases in input prices. He states that the reasons for the slump arise 
from the over optimistic evaluation of the economy in the 90s. The entry in the European 
Monetary Union raised hopes in investors for faster growth. Investment and Consumption 
increased by trimming off savings. Once again the structural issues of low productivity 
weigh heavily on growth and when input accumulation stopped (due to the excessive 
accumulation in the 90s) the results was not good.  
The general idea that is extracted from these papers is that productivity is king. 
Most of these cases of stagnation highlight that the relationship between inputs and outputs 
is the most important factor determining growth. The Portuguese case, seems to follow this. 
Portugal did not have a very strong productivity growth historically and as soon as it 
stopped accumulating inputs growth stopped.  
But what influences Total Factor Productivity? According to a 2007 U.N. Industrial 
Development organization working paper there are many factors that affect TFP. Some 
examples are capital intensity, education, technology, institutions, health, among many 
others. The main conclusion from this extensive literature review is that most of the 
analytical links between TFP and variables are determined empirically and, according to 
the paper, is that it is “yet too inconclusive for policy implications.” Essentially there is no 
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consensus on the true cause but capital intensity, education, technology and institutions 
seem very likely candidates. 
b) Growth 
Growth theory provides the theoretical framework that helps explain how the inner 
workings of an economy help it grow. The starting point is the Solow growth model 
generally seen as the solid base for further extensions. It states that the main factors that 
cause growth are capital accumulation, labor and total factor productivity. Lucas (1988) 
provides extensions for this model by introducing factors such as technological change and 
human capital accumulation through learning by doing and schooling. Portugal has a 
traditionally poor schooling system which still has not covered many parts of the 
population. Even though it is improving its effects are still not generalized as there is still a 
lot of the population without any education besides the first four years of schooling. 
Learning by doing could be a source of human capital accumulation in Portugal but it is 
somewhat hard to measure on a macro level. This paper also mentions the benefits of 
international trade to GDP growth. The two previous papers provide a strong basis for 
variables including both the stock of labor and capital. As such Capital per worker, per hour 
and per educated person will be used.   
As evidenced from the previous section the increase in foreign capital has been a 
determining factor in recent years. However its role on growth can be dubious. E. 
Borensztein et al. (1998) present the idea that FDI increases growth given a certain 
technological level in the country. This means that large foreign investment may become 
somewhat meaningless if the country cannot accept the technological improvements (in 
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case the country is lagging behind in technological terms). This may mean that the foreign 
capital growth was rendered useless due to low human capital. Further down the work 
project it will be seen if there was a significant impact or not. Another important aspect 
regarding technology is the ability to increase the production possibilities frontier. Romer 
(1990) creates a 3-sector model in which human capital can be devoted to research. By 
allocating some capital to the creating of more technology the country increases 
productivity. Human capital is once again a cornerstone for growth and it spills over to 
productivity growth.  
The trade balance was one of the first issues to be studied in economics and its 
importance has only increased. It is generally accepted that trade improves the welfare of a 
country as it expands the available market, product selection and prices. Frankel and Romer 
(1999) show another possible way trade increases income. “Trade appears to raise income 
by spurring the accumulation of physical and human capital and by increasing output for 
given levels of capital”.  
Finally there is one last factor that is important for Portugal: the Government. 
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) provide an in-depth look into this matter and find that “the 
evidence that tax rates matter for growth is disturbingly fragile.” This statement seems to be 
verified later by the regressions. However public investments, namely in transport and 
communications, can yield net positive returns. There is still the flipside where public 
investment yields a lower return than the investment it crowded out yielding a net negative 
for society. 
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III. Data 
Inspired by the theories presented above a set of variables was selected. The time 
period used in the model is from 1979 to 2013. Most of the data is from the AMECO 
database. For the explained variable, real GDP was used; it is the most common 
replacement for output. 
 The first candidate for explanatory variable was productivity. Many of the typical 
variables for productivity cannot be used as they are calculated using GDP.  GDP per hour 
has a similar problem. A surrogate indicator is then needed. Return on capital, the 
compensation of employees, or institutional information could provide for a decent 
substitute for productivity.   
Education is highlighted as another important factor. The Barro-Lee dataset which 
includes the percentage of population that has attended several degrees of education is quite 
extensive but only has quinquennial data. There is another dataset by the world bank 
featuring gross enrollment in either primary, secondary or tertiary school. Even though the 
time series was long enough there were some breaks. The solution for this was using a 
linear interpolation to fill in the blanks. The biggest gap is during the 81-85 period where 
secondary education has a 5-year break. The remaining breaks are only of one period. Even 
with this makeshift methodology the data seems to have a good fit as increases in 
enrollment aren’t particularly great during the missing period. The other side of human 
capital, learning by doing, is difficult to capture for the economy as a whole, because of this 
it won’t be included.  
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Investment is also very important for economic growth. A set of variables was tried. 
Foreign Direct Investment, loans to households and financial corporations, and net return 
on net capital. The latter variable has some issues when used conjointly with the 
compensation of employees due to its calculation. Regarding return on capital, which is 
essential to determine the degree of investment, two variables were tried: The interest rate 
on Portuguese Debt and the return on the Portuguese stock market.  
Joining both the education and capital variables is capital intensity. Three types will 
be calculated because of the various possibilities. The stock of capital, calculated by 
AMECO by compiling GFCF for a large number of years, is divided by hours worked in 
the economy, by workers and by the gross enrollment in secondary education times the 
population. This yields three variables: Capital per hour worked, Capital per worker and 
what will be called Effective Capital for simplicity.  
Another possible influence on investment is the government size or taxation which 
could be causing crowding out. A couple of variables that were created in order to capture 
both education and capital was the stock of capital per worker, per hour worked and per 
person times the rate of enrollment in secondary education. Unfortunately the breaks in the 
Barro-Lee dataset make it unusable.  
 During this time period three important events happened that could have a direct 
effect in exports: The introduction of the Euro, the entry of many developing countries to 
the world markets, and the dramatic increases in oil and food prices. The price of crude was 
obtained from the FRED database, it would be more correct to use Brent but the variation is 
similar and WTI crude oil had a longer time series. To include the entry of developing 
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countries an index of competitor countries was created; the process is described below. The 
differential between growth in exports in competing countries vs. those of Portugal may 
also be relevant. Calculating this was a multi-step process. 
 First the revealed advantage was computed from the OECD database on exports by 
commodities. This list of about 100 commodity types has exports from 35 countries1 which 
will henceforth be representative of world exports. From this list the revealed comparative 
advantage for each commodity in each country was calculated. Countries that revealed 
advantages similar to those of Portugal during the sample of 1989 to 2007 were considered 
competitors. The list of competitor countries considered is, by decreasing amount of similar 
industries: Spain, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Turkey, Italy, Poland, and Austria. 
The Competitor exports are then a weighted average of these countries exports.  
The variables for government intervention are sparse for Portugal. Still, as 
government can influence growth, some variables were included. On the revenue side both 
direct taxes, indirect taxes, deficit and total tax burden were included. On the spending side 
total government consumption could not be used as is connected to GDP and most other 
variables had a small sample size. Subsidies were then chosen as an example variable for 
government spending. Most other interesting variables had too small a sample size, mostly 
ranging from 1995 to 2013. 
                                                 
1 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Chinese Taipei, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. 
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Lastly the non-tradable to tradable ratio and the consumer price index growth for 
construction and dwellings were included. These should be significant if there was a drag 
caused by over investing in exportless sectors. 
IV. Model 
The model used in this work project was determined empirically. The final variable 
list is in table 1. All of the variables were tested on unit roots and many were promptly 
discarded or transformed. Issues also arose as some the variables available are derived from 
GDP and are endogenous. Problems with causality also can occur. First, every variable was 
regressed on GDP in order to provide an initial overview of the interactions. Then several 
attempts at final regressions were made, each taking into account variables for inputs, 
productivity and world events. These models were thoroughly tested in regards to 
heteroskedacity, serial correlation, multicollinearity, over specification and causality. Table 
7 describes the best models that were obtained.  
Some variables are clearly better than others. Effective capital seems to be better 
than capital per worker in all regressions. Capital per hours worked was difficult to use as it 
had a causality issue with GDP (Did GDP increase because the number of hours increased 
or vice-versa?) since no instrumenting solution was found for hours it was ignored. 
Competitor’s exports growth yields more significance to the model than world exports. 
Both growth in loans and CPI changes seem to lose significance when used with the other 
variables. The question then becomes whether to use the growth in real wages, the growth 
in average nominal wage or the growth of nominal wage per worker. Before making this 
decision there is still one important issue.  
 
Page 13 of 25 
 
Causality was a major preoccupation as it was unclear whether an increase in GDP 
would increase compensation or vice-versa. Answering this required experimenting with an 
Instrumental Variable model in which compensation was considered endogenous. In order 
to find suitable instruments variables with high correlation with the explanatory variable 
but low correlation with GDP growth were needed. Table 8 has the correlation for some 
variables. The resulting IV regressions, in table 9, all seem to have good instruments and 
the instruments seem to be valid according to the Sargan test. Where there is some 
difference is in the Wu-Hausman test which states that the real compensation is exogenous 
and does not need to be instrumented, this is some evidence that real compensation causes 
GDP growth and not the other way around. The reason for the inverse causality in nominal 
compensation could be the influence of GDP growth in increases in the price level. Even if 
real compensation was endogenous the quality of its model, as measured by r-square, was 
higher than the others. Real compensation growth was then used for the final model. 
𝑌𝑑,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑑,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑑,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑘𝑙𝑑,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑌𝑑,𝑡−1             ( 1) 
T indicates time and d the yearly percentage change. As such the above model says 
that the yearly change in real GDP is linearly dependent on the growth in real compensation 
of employees (rce), the export growth of the main competitors from Portugal, and the 
growth in the ratio of Capital per capita times the gross enrollment in secondary education. 
V. Results 
The estimation results are in the table 10. Figures 1 and 2 help visualize the patterns 
variables took during this period.  
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 Capital per person with secondary education has a positive impact on growth, 
increasing the amount of capital an educated worker has leads to greater output for the 
economy. During the 90’s this variable experienced great growth that suddenly stopped in 
the early 00s and began decreasing. Less inputs will lead to lower growth if there is not a 
corresponding productivity growth, which there is no evidence of.  
The exports of competitors also improves Portuguese GDP. This is most likely 
because Portuguese exports have little say in global terms and simply follow the trends. It 
is important to note that competitor’s exports are better at describing GDP than world 
exports and that around 1998 the difference between growth rates starts being more 
noticeable. This could lead to a slowdown in Portuguese exports and as such would explain 
part of the stagnation of GDP. Another interesting fact is that the difference between 
Portuguese exports and the competitor’s exports has lessened in the studied period. In the 
early 90s the difference became close to zero. Before that Portuguese exports consistently 
grew faster when more competitors started entering the markets the growth rates converged 
and Portugal lost its edge.  
Finally the real compensation of employees. The sign is positive which goes against 
initial idea that it would decrease productivity by increasing costs. It could in fact be the 
other way around. Businesses are only increasing wages when the productivity enables 
them to do so meaning that this variable would actually follow the growth in productive 
capacity. It could also be an effect from the higher purchasing power that households 
gained which increases consumption. This is speculation and there are many other possible 
reasons.  
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Another important regression includes the growth in the percentage of non-tradables 
to tradables showed in table 11. This is inspired by the Reis paper in which he attributes a 
great deal of the crisis on the increase of this ratio. The issue for this variable, and the 
reason for its exclusion in the main model is that is has a low sample size of only 16 data 
points. Even so when included in the regressions it did not reach significance. Still, a more 
through dataset would be needed to make a strong claim on the importance or not of this 
variable.  
What these results tell is that what happened in Portugal is similar to the case of 
Japan, Mexico and Chile. There was a lot of factor accumulation in the 80s and 90s that 
suddenly stopped in the turn of the century. The reasons for this drop in factor 
accumulation are not entirely clear. What is evident from other time series is that net return 
on net capital stopped increasing since 1987. The only other country in the AMECO 
database with a similar situation is Spain. Two other countries also had a decrease in net 
return during the 1960-2013 period: Greece and Belgium.  
Regarding the variables that didn’t make it to the final cut there are some interesting 
factors. Oil prices seem to be somewhat uncorrelated with the stagnation. Oil should have 
an impact as it increases both the cost of transportation and electricity. Foreign direct 
investment is also a notable absence. Initially there was the expectation that FDI would 
improve growth but, as Borensztein et al. (1998) state, FDI doesn’t necessarily increase 
growth if there is not a sufficient level of education. As predicted in Easterly and Rebelo 
(1993) taxation had no significant effect but it proved a good instrument for some variables.  
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These regressions should be econometrically correct and, although simple, provide 
some insights on the growth of Portuguese GDP. Labor has an important role as it is the 
main input in production and its compensation has a positive impact in GDP. Effective 
capital is very important for growth as it provides labor the means of production. Finally 
the external sector provides a way of funneling production and for new money to enter the 
economy.  
VI. Conclusion 
So what did happen to Portugal? What the above model seems to indicate is that 
capital intensity and compensation began to stagnate. Export growth, namely in the sectors 
in which Portugal has a competitive advantage, seems to have also slowed down. The 
factors allied with momentum in GDP growth made growth slowdown immensely.  
Amador and Coimbra (2007) seem to be right when they state that Portugal owes 
most of its growth to factor accumulation.  The comment on Reis (2013) by Olivier 
Blanchard also seconds’ this. He argues that whilst higher capital flows may have 
influenced the country negatively it is not entirely convincing that it is one of the major 
causes. The low significance of foreign direct investment, growth in interest rates and the 
PSI stock index seems to corroborate this idea. What are then the real world implications of 
these results? First that motivating investments in both high quality capital and education is 
very important. According to the Equity and Quality in Education report from the OCDE 
Portugal is the country with the 3rd highest percentage (around 50%) of 25-34 years old that 
have not completed upper secondary education in 2009. This means that the trend for low 
investment in education has not ended. The real compensation of employees also has 
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stagnated. Also preoccupying is the unequal manner in which labor compensation is being 
distributed. The world top incomes database, which still has some breaks in the data and 
only goes up to 2005, shows that income for the bottom 90% has increased at a much 
slower pace than for the top 10%. In 1989 it was of 8,468 in 2005€ and 32,972 in 2005€ 
respectively and in 2005 it was 10,024 in 2005€ and 55,888 in 2005€.  
The sectors in which Portugal is competitive could also be considered worrying as 
they are all low-income sectors that can be easily substituted (as they have been). Adding to 
that, growth in those sectors appears to have slowed down on a world level. 
Many other factors still influence GDP and another major issue is what causes 
productivity to not grow. Institutions, education, infrastructure, the judicial system, and 
many other variables also have an impact through productivity. The real reasons as to why 
productivity and input accumulation halted are still a mystery but it seems apparent that 
they played a significant part in halting growth for Portugal. 
The future is still unknown. Input accumulation may pick-up and growth return but 
the debt overhang may prove that difficult. The difficult process for changing institutional 
processes can make productivity improvements harder. The reality described in Blanchard 
(2006) did in fact turn true and the solutions there still seem valid: There is much room for 
improvement but not much political and social leeway to make a relevant impact. In the end 
Portugal may be stuck in a boom slump cycle until the structural issues are definitely 
solved.  
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VIII. Annexes 
Table 1 Variable Descriptions 
 
Table 2 Main Competitors 
 
Variable Legend Variable Legend
d_r_y Real GDP Growth exsample World Export Growth
d_oil_wti Oil Price Growth d_psi PSI Growth
d_def Deficit Growth d_ot Debt Interest rate Growth
d_tdir Direct Tax Growth e1 Population with Primary Education Growth
d_tindr Indirect Tax Growth e2 Population with Secondary Education Growth
d_lsnf Corporation Debt Growth e3 Population with Tertiary Education Growth
d_lhouse Household Debt Growth d_kh Capital per hour worked Growth
d_loan Loan Growth d_kw Capital per Worker Growth
d_tot Terms of Trade Growth d_kl Capital per Person with Secondary Education
d_fdi2 FDI Growth dtheta Income Share of Labour
d_rce Real Wage Growth d_ip Industrial Production Growth
d_ulc Unit Labor Cost Growth d_cpi CPI Growth
d_cepop Wage per capita Growth d_cpi_c Construction CPI Growth
d_cewpop Wage per worker growth d_cpi_d Dwellings CPI Growth
excomp Competitor's Export Growth t Taxation Revenue
Country Avg. Competitiveness Country Avg. Competitiveness
Australia 9.40                                   Italy 19.80                                 
Austria 18.54                                 Japan 2.00                                   
Belgium 20.73                                 Korea 8.57                                   
Canada 10.30                                 Luxembourg 13.78                                 
Chile 9.94                                   Mexico 10.00                                 
Chinese Taipei 12.88                                 Netherlands 13.00                                 
Czech Republic 20.67                                 New Zealand 12.53                                 
Denmark 17.35                                 Norway 5.25                                   
Estonia 20.15                                 Poland 19.31                                 
Finland 8.30                                   Slovak Republic 15.55                                 
France 11.05                                 Slovenia 16.92                                 
Germany 13.70                                 Spain 21.80                                 
Greece 17.85                                 Sweden 7.55                                   
Hong Kong, China 11.25                                 Switzerland 4.05                                   
Hungary 13.75                                 Turkey 19.89                                 
Iceland 5.95                                   United Kingdom 6.25                                   
Ireland 6.15                                   United States 6.68                                   
Israel 4.38                                   
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Table 3 Competitive Sectors 
 
  





Sector Years Sector Years
Aquatic Animals 20 Ores, slag and ash 19
Products of animal origin 20 Umbrellas and walking-sticks 19
Animal oils and biproducts 20 Arms and ammunition 18
Meat, fish and seafood food preparations 20 Salt, sulphur and others 17
Vegetable food preparations 20 Furniture 17
Beverages, spirits and vinegar 20 Textile fabric 15
Wood and related 20 Lac, gums, and other extracts 14
Cork and articles of cork 20 Paper and related 14
Pulp of wood 20 Animal hair and Wool 14
Cotton 20 Tin and articles 14
Manmade staple fibres 20 Vehicles other than railway 12
Cordage and others 20 Rubber and articles 9
Carpets and others 20 Dairy products 8
Apparel, knit or crochet 20 Coffee, tea, mate and spices 8
Apparel, not knit or crochet 20 Special woven fabric 8
Other made textile articles 20 Headgear and parts 8
Footwear 20 Articles of iron or steel 8
Stone, plaster, cement, asbestos 20 Sugars and articles 7
Ceramic products 20 Basketwork and plaiting 7
Glass and glassware 20 Tobacco 6
Miscellaneous articles of base metal 20 Aluminium 6
Number of Years between 1988 and 2007 Portugal had a revealed competitive advantage
Variable p-value Variable p-value
d_r_y 0.0343    exsample -           
d_oil_wti -           d_psi -           
d_def -           d_ot 0.0063    
d_tdir 0.0007    e1 -           
d_tindr -           e2 -           
d_lsnf 0.1836    e3 -           
d_lhouse 0.0287    d_kh 0.0019    
d_loan 0.4531    d_kw -           
d_tot 0.0002    d_kl -           
d_fdi2 -           dtheta 0.0001    
d_rce 0.0022    d_ip 0.0107    
d_ulc 0.0001    d_cpi 0.0001    
d_cepop 0.0057    d_cpi_c 0.0008    
d_cewpop 0.0027    d_cpi_d 0.0009    
excomp -           t 0.0021    
- Indicates 0
Phillips Perron test Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
d_r_y 35 2.276 2.849 -3.315 7.816
d_kw 36 0.026 0.017 -0.014 0.071
d_kl 35 0.012 0.064 -0.150 0.178
d_rce 37 1.240 3.153 -7.125 8.920
d_cepop 37 5.415 8.107 -9.564 23.831
d_cewpop 37 4.966 8.209 -11.417 26.024
excomp 37 5.348 4.808 -12.319 14.434
exsample 37 5.919 4.329 -11.212 13.564
d_loan 34 12.936 9.623 -5.538 27.353
d_cpi_c 36 0.041 0.058 -0.090 0.225
d_cpi_d 36 0.040 0.059 -0.090 0.225
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Table 6 Initial Regressions 
 
Table 7 Second Regressions 
 
d_r_y Coef. Std Dev. P-value R-Square d_r_y Coef. Std Dev. P-value R-Square
d_rce 0.411163 0.13722 0.005 0.2139 d_loan 0.133321 0.044097 0.005 0.2222
d_ulc 0.102625 0.075119 0.181 0.0535 d_ot -1.17628 2.549844 0.648 0.0064
d_cepop 0.200149 0.052296 0.001 0.3074 d_psi -0.01144 0.020713 0.586 0.0126
d_cewpop 0.163903 0.054428 0.005 0.2156 d_oil_wti 0.010281 0.012202 0.406 0.0211
d_r_y Coef. Std Dev. P-value R-Square d_r_y Coef. Std Dev. P-value R-Square
excomp 0.252122 0.091076 0.009 0.1885 d_def 0.230794 0.268544 0.4 0.034
exsample 0.271497 0.100818 0.011 0.1802 d_tdir 0.801692 0.741342 0.292 0.0528
d_fdi2 0.00276 0.004506 0.544 0.0112 d_tindr 0.902661 0.846051 0.298 0.0514
d_tot 0.030334 0.134749 0.823 0.0015 t 6.19717 4.369228 0.165 0.0575
d_r_y Coef. Std Dev. P-value R-Square d_r_y Coef. Std Dev. P-value R-Square
e1 38.49948 25.55152 0.143 0.075 dtheta 10.85659 14.82691 0.469 0.016
e2 -7.68702 7.371823 0.324 0.0304 d_ip 0.563629 0.097541 0 0.5029
e3 6.281478 7.159391 0.388 0.0277 d_cpi 16.20458 10.32291 0.126 0.0695
d_kw 48.70374 28.19396 0.093 0.0829 d_cpi_c 18.10648 8.641423 0.044 0.1174
d_kl 14.14155 7.304956 0.062 0.1048 d_cpi_d 18.29894 8.449837 0.038 0.1244
Regressions
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
L.d_r_y 0.011 0.008 0.051 0.015 0.001 0.011 0.003
d_kw 0.181 0.071 0.352
d_kl 0.009 0.043 0.056 0.107
d_rce 0.000 0.000
d_cepop 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
d_cewpop 0.000
excomp 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
exsample 0.000 0.000
d_loan 0.096 0.138 0.317
d_cpi_c 0.580 0.172 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
d_cpi_d 0.000
Adj R-squared 0.693 0.734 0.800 0.821 0.726 0.803 0.783
bgodfrey 0.18         0.89         0.86         0.14         0.05         0.22         0.85         
hettest 0.37         0.83         0.05         0.25         0.58         0.17         0.19         
VIF 1.70         1.51         2.64         2.50         2.29         2.51         2.67         
Ramsey RESET 0.78         0.59         0.56         0.92         0.52         0.97         1.00         
dwatson 1.59         0.19         2.01         2.36         2.51         2.35         2.04         
Signficance
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Table 8 Correlations Table 
 
Table 9 IV Models 
 
 
Corr d_r_y d_rce d_cepop d_cewpop
dtheta 0.1264 0.8413 0.5925 0.6088
d_tot 0.0392 0.3348 0.1001 0.1075
d_ot -0.08 -0.2381 -0.1816 -0.1595
t 0.2397 0.5084 0.1732 0.1684
d_cpi 0.2636 0.3481 0.8673 0.8653
Model 1 2 3
L.d_r_y 0.003 0.002 0.000
d_kl 0.003 0.183 0.169
excomp 0.000 0.000 0.000
d_rce 0.001 - -
d_cepop - 0.053 -
d_cewpop - - 0.066
R-square 0.727 0.678 0.655
Wu-Hausman 0.284 0.000 0.071
Sargan 0.176 0.060 0.064
d_rce = d_tot d_ot t d_cepop = d_cpi dtheta
d_cewpop = d_cpi dtheta
Significance in IV Regressions
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Table 10 Final Model 
 
Table 11 Model with growth in Tradable ratio 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.5665935   .4353662    -1.30   0.204    -1.458401    .3252136
      excomp     .1945289   .0509563     3.82   0.001     .0901497    .2989082
       d_rce     .3860143   .0900762     4.29   0.000     .2015016     .570527
        d_kl     12.35776   4.591537     2.69   0.012     2.952419     21.7631
              
         L1.     .4354317   .1045375     4.17   0.000     .2212963    .6495671
       d_r_y  
                                                                              
       d_r_y        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    232.067949    32  7.25212341           Root MSE      =  1.4295
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.7182
    Residual    57.2148353    28  2.04338698           R-squared     =  0.7535
       Model    174.853114     4  43.7132784           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  4,    28) =   21.39
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      33
                                                                              
       _cons    -.6294011   .5807395    -1.08   0.304    -1.923369    .6645672
              
         L1.     .4268289   .1692766     2.52   0.030     .0496572    .8040006
       d_r_y  
              
     d_trade     -51.7089   55.52871    -0.93   0.374    -175.4346    72.01677
       d_rce     .6597826   .2379323     2.77   0.020     .1296364    1.189929
        d_kl     14.26114   8.076782     1.77   0.108    -3.735047    32.25734
      excomp     .1882943   .0587143     3.21   0.009     .0574706     .319118
                                                                              
       d_r_y        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    75.2998608    15  5.01999072           Root MSE      =  1.1556
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.7340
    Residual    13.3544412    10  1.33544412           R-squared     =  0.8226
       Model    61.9454196     5  12.3890839           Prob > F      =  0.0016
                                                       F(  5,    10) =    9.28
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      16
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Figure 1 Growth of Model and Explanatory Variables  
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